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ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. DOES THE FACT THAT BIRD DEATHS WILL OC-
CUR ONLY IF BLACKACRE LOGS DURING NEST-
ING SEASON, AN OCCURRENCE WHICH IS NOT
YET KNOWN, MAKE JUDICIAL REVIEW UNRIPE
OR ELIMINATE STANDING FOR CSB BECAUSE IT
SUFFERS NO PRESENT INJURY?
II. IS THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT, 16 U.S.C.
§ 703(a) (MTBA), A STRICT LIABILITY CRIMINAL
OFFENSE?
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III. DOES THE MBTA PROHIBIT THE KILLING OF MI-
GRATORY BIRDS BY CLEARCUTTING FORESTS
DURING BIRD NESTING SEASON?
IV. IS THE MBTA "LAW" WITH WHICH AGENCY AC-
TIONS UNDER NATIONAL FOREST MANAGE-
MENT ACT, 16 U.S.C. § § 1600 ET SEQ. (NFMA)
MUST BE IN ACCORD FOR PURPOSES OF JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 5 U.S.C. § 706 (APA)?
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This case involves Article III, Section 2, clause 1 of the
United States Constitution. The text is reproduced in Appen-
dix E. This case also involves the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 703 and 707. Also, under Title 16 are
the relevant §§ 1600 and 1604. All sections of Title 16 are
reproduced in Appendix B and G. Set forth in Appendix C
and F are the relevant §§ 4332 and 4321 of Title 42 of the
United States Code. In addition, 5 U.S.C. § 706 can be found
in Appendix D.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The United States Forest Service (Forest Service), within
the Department of Agriculture, developed a natural resource
and management plan (the Plan) for the New Union National
Forest. (R. at 1.) The Plan has been developed pursuant to
1998] 919
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the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600 et
seq. (NFMA). (R. at 1.) The Forest Service's goal is to bal-
ance the preservation of the forest with the need for develop-
ment of the land and the natural resources of the New Union
National Forest. (R. at 1.) To facilitate development, the
Forest Service authorized a timber sale of the "Big Tree
Tract" in May of 1997 to Blackacre Forest Products, Inc.
(Blackacre). See id.
The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(NEPA), requires the Forest Service to prepare an Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS) as part of the required proce-
dure for developing the Plan and authorizing the timber sale
to Blackacre. (R. at 1-2.) The Forest Service prepared an EIS
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (NEPA) and followed the appropriate proce-
dures. (R. at 2-3.) The EIS recognizes that Blackacre's
clearcutting will cause habitat destruction, and the loss of
habitat may add to long term bird population depletion. See
id. Blackacre plans to clearcut all 500 acres of the Big Tree
Tract, and although the area is used for outdoor recreation
and study, it is considered valuable timber. (R. at 1.)
Citizens to Save the Birds Inc. (CSB), is a nonprofit or-
ganization incorporated to "protect the avian population resi-
dent in and migrating through the State of New Union." (R.
at 2.) CSB has opposed the timber sale during the develop-
ment of the Plan and the actual timber sale based on the im-
pact the clearcutting will have on the migratory birds in the
Big Tree Tract. See id. Members of CSB routinely observe
the birds of the Big Tree Tract and use the area for outdoor
recreation. See id. Blackacre is unrestricted as to the time it
may clearcut the Big Tree Tract, and Blackacre stated at a
hearing on the motion to dismiss that "it will harvest timber
during bird nesting season, as well as during other times of
the year." Id. CSB filed suit seeking judicial review of the
Forest Service's timber sale to Blackacre under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (APA). The petitioners
responded by filing a motion to dismiss CSB's suit. The Dis-
trict Court Judge for the District of New Union denied the
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defendants' motion. The defendants have appealed to this
court for further review.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act provides for standing in
this case. Organizations have standing if they allege that
they are aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute.
The Administration Procedure Act allows jurisdiction over
any agency action alleged to be in violation of the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act (MBTA). Standing issues are only raised for
evaluation of government action. The courts have clearly
stated that standing is proper where an action alleged to be
in violation of a statute is final, raises primarily legal issues
and creates the possibility of environmental injury.
In this case, the Forest Service's wrongful clearcutting
authorization, not Blackacre's response thereto, is the gov-
ernment action in violation of the statute relevant to the Citi-
zens to Save the Birds' standing. The Forest Service's
wrongful clearcutting authorization was made final in May of
1997. The Respondents' dispute with the authorization
raises purely legal issues. The authorization clearly violates
the MBTA. Whether Blackacre will actually clearcut during
nesting season or any other time, raises a factual question,
and a jury should resolve this question. Furthermore, the
clearcutting authorization initially creates the possibility
that migratory birds will be killed. Additionally, CSB would
endure undue hardship if standing were denied. A dismissal
based on lack of standing would mean that they have to wait
until birds are killed and their habitat is destroyed before
bringing suit, making the injunctive relief sought useless.
II.
The Forest Service and Blackacre are strictly liable for
taking and killing migratory birds under the MBTA. The leg-
islative history and the 1986 amendment to the penalties sec-
tion of the MBTA evidence Congress' intent to leave the
MBTA misdemeanor crime's requirement of strict liability
19981
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unchanged. All Circuits, except the Fifth Circuit, have con-
cluded that a misdemeanor violation of the MBTA is a strict
liability offense. The Fifth Circuit adds the scant require-
ment of "should have known" to the requisite liability. Fol-
lowing a finding of a violation of the MBTA by the Forest
Service and Blackacre, the court need not inquire as to the
petitioners intent or willfulness. However, should the court
desire to apply the heightened standard of the Fifth Circuit,
the petitioners would still be in violation of the statute. Both
petitioners have evidenced during the hearing their knowl-
edge of the statutory provisions and the possible resulting
deaths of migratory birds. Under any test, the petitioners
should be held strictly liable for their violations of the MBTA.
III.
The MBTA and its legislative history indicate that the
purpose of the statute was to protect migratory birds (game
or non-game) and their habitat. The plain meaning of the
statute indicates that it is unlawful to kill any migratory bird
by any means. Courts have viewed the language of the stat-
ute broadly and narrowly. Courts, interpreting the statute
narrowly, apply the MBTA only to hunting and trading of
birds and bird parts. The broad view of the statute correctly
construes the MBTA to protect migratory birds and their
habitat and should be applied in the present case.
The issue of timber harvesting in National Forests' har-
boring migratory birds currently divides the courts. The pur-
pose and intent of Congress is that the MBTA be applied
broadly to include timber harvesting. A "taking" of a migra-
tory bird, in any way, is a violation under the Act. The Forest
Service and Blackacre are in violation of the MBTA.
The National Forest Service is required under the NEPA
to provide an EIS. If the Forest Service fails to adequately
apply the requirements under the NEPA, the Service will be
in violation of the NEPA. The Forest Service must assess all
alternatives prepared for a proposed action to comply with
NEPA. The Forest Service has agreed with CSB that the pro-
posed action, Blackacre's clearcutting the Big Tree Tract, will
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/16
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kill a number of migratory birds and destroy their habitats.
The Forest Service admitted that the clearcutting will di-
rectly kill a number of migratory birds, and this admission
indicates that the Service did not adequately review the al-
ternatives to clearcutting. In addition, the Service applied in-
adequate data during its planning procedures, and this
action should be reviewed. The Forest Service should be
aware of the scarcity of old growth stands within the State
and their importance to the diversity of species found in this
area. The Forest Service is either not aware of these facts or
failed to rely on them during their decision making
procedures.
The Forest Service and Blackacre have admitted that
they do not intend to provide any additional notice concern-
ing the harvesting of the Big Tree Tract. A notice and com-
ment procedure is required by Congress. A failure by the
Service to provide for a notice and comment period is unlaw-
ful. There are no exclusions provided under this Act to pro-
hibit CSB to adequately address their concerns.
IV.
The APA provides for jurisdiction over agency action.
Especially, when the agency action violates the MBTA. The
Forest Service Plan to allow clearcutting will result in direct
and indirect takings or killings of migratory birds in the Big
Tree Tract. Further, Blackacre plans to clearcut during the
nesting season of these migratory birds. Blackacre's action
will directly violate the MBTA.
Courts review agency actions using the arbitrary and ca-
pricious, abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with the
law standards of review. The Forest Service's Plan inade-
quately addresses the alternatives available to clearcutting,
and the Service did not take a hard look at the information
available. The Forest Service's actions under the NFMA vio-
late the MBTA and should be reviewed under the APA be-
cause the Forest Service's actions do not meet the
requirements set forth in the NEPA.
1998] 923
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I. CSB's CLAIM IS RIPE FOR REVIEW
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR WHEN
BLACKACRE CLEARCUTS THE "BIG TREE
TRACT".
A. CSB Has Standing to Dispute Any Government Action
Which Violates the MBTA.
Organizations have standing if they allege that they are
"aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute," under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994). In the
present case, the "relevant statute" is the MBTA. The APA
provides jurisdiction over any agency action alleged to be in
violation of the MBTA. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robert-
son, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds,
503 U.S. 429 (1992)(originally granting certiorari because a
live controversy existed between an environmental group and
a Forest Service concerning a timber sale enjoined under the
NFMA); Mahler v. United States Forest Service, 927 F. Supp.
1554,. 157,6 (S.D. Ind. 1996). CSB filed suit against the
United States Forest Service (Forest Service) for violating the
MBTA by authorizing a timber sale to Blackacre Forest Prod-
ucts, Inc. (Blackacre). (R. at 2.) The MBTA affords plaintiff
standing to dispute this harmful agency action.
B. The United States Forest Service's Wrongful
Authorization of the Timber Sale is Both Final and a
Primarily Legal Issue and Creates the Harm in
Question for Standing Purposes.
The Forest Service's invasion of the Respondent's legally
protected right, ensuring the preservation of migratory bird
habitat where they observe such birds, creates the harm in
question. (R. at 4.) Although the environmental destruction
would actually result from a third-party response, the gov-
ernment's authorization would be the "but for" cause of the
destruction. This causation creates standing for CSB to op-
pose the Forest Service's authorization. See Wilderness Soc'y
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MOOT COURT
v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 12, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Idaho Conserva-
tion League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1515 (9th Cir. 1992).
In this case, the third party response would be Blackacre's
clearcutting of the Big Tree Tract. The court in Wilderness
Society and Idaho Conservation League states that whether
this will actually occur is not an issue for determining stand-
ing. An issue is ripe for judicial review if it is: (1) primarily
legal ; and (2) where a final action is being challenged. Stan-
dard Alaska Prod. Co. v. Schaible, 874 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 904 (1990).
1. Whether CSB should be afforded standing is purely
a legal issue.
Petitioners do not dispute that the Forest Service author-
ized the timber sale of the "Big Tree Tract" to Blackacre.
This action gives rise to CSB's claim. Petitioners contest that
it is unknown whether this authorization will actually kill
migratory birds. (R. at 4.) This factual argument is both in-
correct and irrelevant to Respondent's standing. The
Supreme Court determined that a challenge to disposal re-
quirements based on a claim of federal preemption to be ripe
for review because the question of preemption is predomi-
nantly legal. See Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
Disposal requirements, similar to a clearcutting authori-
zation, do not in themselves damage the environment.
Rather the damage is dependent upon a third party response
to the requirement or authorization. However, the Court
found it unnecessary to show that the third party action
would in fact damage the environment to determine stand-
ing. A jury should decide a factual question, such as actual
environmental damage. See Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 473
U.S. 190 (1983); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. City of West
Chicago, 914 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1990). In later cases organi-
zations had standing to challenge the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice's decision to allow expanded hunting in wildlife refuges.
See Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Alaska Fish & Wildlife Fed'n and Outdoor
1998] 925
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Council, Inc., v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 1987)
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 988 (1988).
Additionally in Japan Whaling Association, environmen-
tal organizations had standing to challenge the United
States' failure to enforce whaling quotas. Japan Whaling
Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986). The
organizations asserted injury by alleging that whale watch-
ing and studying whales by their members would be affected
adversely by continued killing of whales. See id. In this in-
stance, the government is liable as the 'but for' cause of third
party destruction because of a failure to act.
An expanded hunting authorization and a whaling
quota, similar to a clearcutting authorization, raise questions
of legality but do not in themselves directly cause harm to
game animals, whales, or migratory birds. Courts have con-
sistently held that illegal authorization by the government
coupled with the possibility that harm to the environment
will result makes standing proper. See Japan Whaling Ass'n,
478 U.S. 221; Alaska Fish & Wildlife Fed'n and Outdoor
Council, Inc., 829 F.2d at 935.
2. The issues in dispute do not require further factual
development and are a final government action.
The Forest Service has already authorized the illegal
timber sale giving rise to Respondent's cause of action
against the government. In order to afford respondents
standing, they must demonstrate an injury which has become
final, an injury in fact. The illegal authorization to clearcut
the Big Tree Tract has been made final and is now ripe for
review. (R. at 3.) Even where the government's action is not
yet final, a facial challenge to the legality of a law may be ripe
for judicial review. It is irrelevant to the existence of a justi-
ciable controversy that there will be a time delay before the
disputed provisions come into effect. See Regional Rail Reor-
ganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974) (citation omit-
ted). In this case the government's illegal action has already
occurred, more than satisfying the minimum ripeness re-
quirements. (R. at 1.)
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An injury in fact is an "invasion of a legally protected in-
terest which is... concrete and particularized, and... actual
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). Respon-
dent's legally protected interest is securing the lives of
migratory birds in the Big Tree Tract where they regularly
observe migratory birds. This interest has been invaded by
the Forest Service's allocation of the Big Tree Tract for
clearcutting. Because the authorization became final in May
of 1997, the harm is not merely "imminent" but is "actual."
(R. at 3.) When the challenged action has already occurred,
courts have held that the "harm asserted has matured suffi-
ciently to warrant judicial intervention." Pacific League
Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903, 915 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 457 U.S. 1132, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133
(1982), affd, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (quoting Warth v. Seldon,
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
Respondent seeks injunctive relief against Blackacre to
prevent clearcutting of the Big Tree Tract in the New Union
National Forest. (R. at 1.) Further factual development
would require waiting for Blackacre to begin clearcutting, the
specific action which the Respondents seek to prevent. Wait-
ing for Blackacre to begin clearcutting undermines the pre-
ventative purpose of injunctive relief. See e.g., Lujan, 497
U.S. 871.
Petitioners misconstrue standing in this case to be de-
pendent upon Blackacre's commencement of clearcutting
rather than upon the United States Forest Service's authori-
zation of that clearcutting. Questions of standing are at issue
in a contentment of government action, not private action. In
this case the government action is the Forest Service's au-
thorization of clearcutting.
1998] 927
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C. Standing Is Proper Because the Possibility of Harm
Exists. Whether Blackacre Actually Kills Migratory
Birds in the Future Is Irrelevant to Standing.
"Harm" is not limited to actual, physical, or economic in-
jury. Any adverse effect on an individual's use and enjoy-
ment of land is a sufficient non-economic injury to confer
standing to challenge governmental actions. ACLU v. Rabun
County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1108
(11th Cir. 1983). In the present case CSB's harm is the gov-
ernment's infringement of their legally protected interest in
ensuring the maintenance of migratory bird habitat in the
Big Tree Tract where they regularly observe birds. (R. at 1-
3.) Petitioners argue that this case is not ripe for review be-
cause bird deaths will only occur if Blackacre logs during
nesting season, an occurrence which is not yet known. (R. at
3.) This argument is false on three counts.
First, migratory birds will die as a result of the clearcut-
ting regardless of when Blackacre chooses to clearcut. The
district court noted that the cutting of trees from the Big Tree
Tract would cause the indirect deaths of migratory birds due
to the destruction of habitat caused by the loss of mature for-
est irrespective of when such destruction takes place. (R. at
2.)
Second, the district court also points to Blackacre's state-
ment at the hearing on this Motion in which it makes clear
that it intends to harvest timber during bird nesting season,
as well as at other times of the year. (R. at 2.) The Forest
Service's own Environmental Impact Statement acknowl-
edged that clearcutting during the nesting season "will un-
doubtedly result in the loss of nests with their eggs or chicks."
(R. at 2.)
Third, even if it were not certain whether Blackacre
would kill migratory birds as a result of the Forest Service's
authorization to do so, the possibility that it may kill migra-
tory birds affords CSB standing to dispute that authorization.
The Forest Service's authorization creates a possibility that
migratory birds will die as a direct result of the clearcutting
since there is no restriction concerning the seasons during
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/16
MOOT COURT
which clear cutting is allowed. (R. at 2.) Environmental
groups need not prove that the alleged results will undoubt-
edly occur in order to maintain standing. A requirement of
standing is that the party's claims not be frivolous, and the
party need not establish that it will prevail on the merits of
its case. See City of St. Louis v. Dept. Of Transp., 936 F.2d
1528 (9th Cir. 1991).
In Idaho Conservation League, the court held that where
the failure to make wilderness recommendations would not
have occurred "but for" the Secretary's decision, the fact that
development in those areas might never take place or that a
redrafted Environmental Impact Statement might change
the Secretary's recommendation, was irrelevant. As in the
present case, the issue of whether the environmental destruc-
tion would occur was unknown. The court noted that the as-
serted injury at issue was that, due to a deficient
Environmental Impact Statement, environmental conse-
quences might be overlooked. Therefore, the ultimate out-
come after additional procedures were followed was not at
issue. See Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1518.
Similarly, the court in Duke Power Co. allowed suit by
groups and individuals living near the proposed sites of nu-
clear power plants. The court found that the possibility of ad-
verse consequences to lakes near power plants was sufficient
to constitute "injury in fact." In this case, the plant-site was
merely proposed. Also, the government did not open the land
to power plant development in general. Had Duke Power
Company decided to build plants on the proposed site, the en-
vironment would have been harmed. However, it was not
necessary to prove that the plants would be built. See Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59
(1978).
D. Judicial Review Is Proper in This Case Because a
Denial Will Cause CSB to Incur Undue Hardship.
In deciding whether an issue is ripe for review, the court
evaluates "the hardship to the parties of with-holding court
consideration." Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 307 U.S. 136, 149
19981 929
17
930 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
(1967). A finding for the Petitioners in this matter would
mean that CSB would have to wait for Blackacre to actually
kill migratory birds and destroy their habitat before bringing
suit. CSB does not seek monetary damages but injunctive re-
lief. After clearcutting begins, injunctive relief becomes use-
less, and clearly imposes undue hardship upon CSB. It is for
this reason that environmental groups have consistently been
granted standing without showing that the harm sought to be
prevented through injunction will undoubtedly occur. See
City of St. Louis, 936 F.2d 1528; Duke Power Co., Inc., 438
U.S. 59; Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. 221; Humane Society
of the United States, 840 F.2d 45; Alaska Fish & Wildlife
Fed'n and Outdoor Council, Inc., 829 F.2d at 935.
II. A VIOLATION OF THE MIGRATORY BIRD
TREATY ACT, 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (MBTA), IS A
STRICT LIABILITY CRIMINAL OFFENSE.
A. The Legislative History and Language of the MBTA
Evidencing Congress's Intent to Create a Strict
Liability Offense.
In 16 U.S.C. § 707(a), the penalty for violating 16 U.S.C.
§ 703(a) is a misdemeanor crime carrying with it a fine "of not
more than $ 500" or imprisonment not to exceed six months,
or both. 16 U.S.C. § 707 (a) (1994). Congress intended the
misdemeanor penalty under § 707(a) to be one of strict liabil-
ity, and their statements following the 1986 amendment of
§ 707 (b) evidenced this intent. See Mahler v. United States
Forest Service, 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1580 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (quot-
ing Sen. Rep. No. 445, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1986) (which
states in part that "[niothing in this amendment in intended
to alter the 'strict ' standard for misdemeanor prosecutions
under 16 U.S.C. § 707(a), a standard which as been upheld in
many Federal court decisions."); See also United States v.
Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 1995)).
Congress specifically did not add a knowledge require-
ment to the misdemeanor charge outlined in § 707(a). See
Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1578. Although the courts are con-
tinually interpreting the MBTA and the 1986 amendment ad-
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ding "knowingly" to § 707(b), the strict liability requirement
in § 707(a) is applied in all circuits, except the Fifth, whose
variation is a slightly heightened standard. See United States
v. Sylvester, 848 F.2d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 1988); Dennis Jen-
kins, Comment: Criminal Prosecution and the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act: An Analysis of the Constitution an Criminal In-
tent in an Environmental Context, 24 B.E. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 595, 618 (1997). The Supreme Court has not ruled on
this issue, so currently the legislature's creation of §707(a)
which excludes a requirement of intent does not violate due
process under the Constitution. See Jenkins, supra, at 622.
B. In Any Circuit, Blackacre and The Forest Service Are
Strictly Liable
The language of § 703 states that "it shall be unlawful at
any time, by any means or in any manner" to commit the
listed actions. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a). The Second Circuit out-
lined this portion of the MBTA in a jury charge and intention-
ally added that the "Government in this case does not have to
prove that the defendant intended to kill the birds" to ensure
the jury applied strict liability. United States v. FMC Corp.,
572 F.2d 902, 904 (2d Cir. 1978). All circuits, excluding the
Fifth Circuit, have interpreted the statute and legislative his-
tory to apply strict liability to misdemeanor crimes under the
MBTA. See Boynton, 63 F.3d at 343.
The Fifth Circuit has added a "should have known" level
of scienter as a "necessary element for an offense under the
MBTA." Sylvester, 848 F.2d at 522 (quoting United States v.
Delahoussaye, 573 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1978.) The Sev-
enth Circuit followed the Third Circuit in applying strict lia-
bility but pointed out the possibility of unintended results,
such as a person being held liable for ridding his land of pi-
geons. United States v. Van Fossan, 899 F.2d 636, 638 (7th
Cir. 1990) (construing United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425,
432 (3d Cir. 1986)).
The legislature left the possibility of misapplication of
the strict liability requirement to the "sound discretion of
prosecutors and the courts." FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905; See
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also Scott Finet, Habitat Protection and the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 10 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 18 (1996). Prosecutors and
judges are better able to carry out the intentions of Congress
because Congressional statements and legislative history
clearly outline the strict liability provision of § 707(a). See
Finet, supra, at 18. The courts and prosecutors have been
given great discretion to apply the statute broadly, which has
not led to widespread abuse, and "the strict provisions should
not impede use of the MBTA for habitat protection purposes.
Id. The Mahler court's lack of faith in prosecutors' judgment
in prosecuting strict liability cases under § 703 is not shared
by other courts or Congress. Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1579.
The potential prosecution of "trivial violations" and abuse of
the law exists in many contexts other than the MBTA, so if
possible abuse of the statute determines its validity, many
laws would be invalid. Finet, supra, at 19.
C. Blackacre and the Forest Service are Strictly Liable for
Violating the MBTA
The Forest Service admits that migratory birds would be
killed as a result of the timber sale to Blackacre. (R. at 3.)
The United States agrees that § 703 is penalized as a strictly
liable offense under § 707(a). (R. at 3.) Blackacre argues that
Mahler concludes the MBTA is not a strict liability statute.
This is incorrect because the court in Mahler concluded that
the MBTA did not include the actions of the defendants, but
§ 707(a) does hold a violator under §703 strictly liable. Mah-
ler, 927 F. Supp. at 1573, 1580-81.
Even under the Fifth Circuit's "should have known" test
or the "knowingly" requirement under the felony charge of
§ 707(b), Blackacre and the Forest Service would still be lia-
ble. Blackacre stated at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss
the suit that it intended to harvest timber during bird nest-
ing season and argued the MBTA would not be violated. (R.
at 2.) Blackacre is aware of the law and plans to knowingly
and intentionally kill migratory birds by harvesting timber
from the Big Tree Tract year around. (R. at 2.) Therefore,
provided Blackacre's actions are found to be in violation of
§ 703, the court may hold Blackacre strictly liable for a mis-
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demeanor violation under § 707(a), and possibly a felony
since Blackacre will knowingly violate the MBTA under
§ 707(b).
III. THE MBTA PROHIBITS THE KILLING OF
MIGRATORY BIRDS BY CLEARCUTTING
FORESTS DURING BIRD NESTING
SEASON.
A. The Legislative History and the Pertinent Language of
the MBTA Makes it Unlawful to Take or Kill a
Migratory Bird.
The pertinent language of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
of 1918 is, "Unless and except as permitted by regulations...
it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any man-
ner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, cap-
ture or kill ... any migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of
any such bird... included in the terms of the conventions...
" Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16,
1916, U.S.-Can., 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628 (codified and
amended as 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994)). The plain meaning of
the statute indicates that the killing of any migratory bird is
unlawful. See id. The Convention between the United
States and the Government of Japan, concluded on March 4,
1972, provided for the protection of migratory birds and birds
in danger of extinction, and their environment., Convention
Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of Japan for the Protection of Migratory
Birds in Danger of Extinction, and their Environment, March
4, 1972, U.S.-Japan, 25 U.S.T. 3329. Additionally, the con-
vention between the United States and the former Soviet
Union adds for the conservation of migratory birds and their
environment. Convention Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concern-
ing the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environ-
ment, May 23, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 29 U.S.T. 4647. See also
Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game
Mammals, Feb. 7, 1936, U.S.-Mex. 50 Stat. 1311, T.S. No.
912. The resulting treatises between the United States and
9331998]
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the aforementioned countries during the conventions provide
the foundation and structure for the MBTA. These treatises
indicate the concern for the protection of migratory birds and
their habitats. Additionally, the legislative history of the
MBTA illustrates that the purpose of the statute was for the
management of game birds, the protection of non-game birds,
and the protection of bird habitats. See 56 CONG. REC. 7364
(1918); H.R. REP. No. 65-243, at 2 (1918); 56 CONG. REC.
7360-61 (1918).
B. The Courts are Divided on How to Treat Cases Dealing
with Habitat Modification or Degradation by Timber
Harvesting.
After examination of a series of cases concerning timber
harvesting on public lands, the courts tend to view Forest
Management Plans either narrowly or broadly. As previously
discussed, the language of the statute is broad. For example,
"by any means or in any manner" includes a number of of-
fenses for the killing or taking of migratory birds. However,
if a court finds that a plaintiff can prove that the planned har-
vests, approved in a Forest Management Plan, directly con-
stitutes a "taking" of migratory birds, the Forest Service
would be in violation of the MBTA. Other cases have found
that an indirect or unintentional "taking" of migratory birds
is a violation of the MBTA.
In Sierra Club v. United States Department of Agricul-
ture, the Forest Service adopted an Amended Land and Re-
source Management Plan (ALRMP) for the harvesting of
timber in the Shawnee National Forest in Illinois. Sierra
Club v. United States Dep't of Agric., No. 94-CV-4061-JPG
(S.D. Ill. 1995). The Sierra Club objected to the ALRMP as it
violated the MBTA. The plaintiffs stated the violation as de-
stroying the essential habitat for neo-tropical migratory birds
and thereby directly killing such birds by allowing logging
during neo-tropical nesting periods. See id. The issues the
court identified were: (1) whether the ALRMP resulted in
habitat modification or degradation that was a "taking"
under the MBTA; and (2) whether the ALRMP instigated di-
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rect "takings" of young migratory birds by allowing timber
harvesting during the nesting seasons. Id. at 33-34.
Regarding the first issue, the court held that a "'taking'
does not occur simply because of habitat modification or deg-
radation." Id at 33. The basis for the court's holding on the
first issue was based on the analysis in Seattle Audubon Soci-
ety v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302-03 (9th Cir. 1991). In Evans,
the court looked at the meaning of the word "take" in the En-
dangered Species Act (ESA) and the MBTA. In Sierra Club,
the court found the comparison of the term "take" persuasive.
"[T]he statutory language of the MBTA differs from the ESA
in that the word harm (along with the words, harass, wound,
and trap) is not included. This is strong evidence that the
MBTA does not include a prohibition of habitat modification
or degradation." Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Agric.,
No. 94-CV-4061-JPG at 34.
The second issue addressed by the court concerned the
provision by the ALRMP establishing Forest Interior Man-
agement Units (FIMUs). The ALRMP requires that "750
acres of each FIMU consists of trees at least 50 years old." Id.
at 13. FIMUs consist of 1,100 acre units of forest. See id.
FIMUs are designed to protect the habitat of bird species in
the forest interiors requiring a "nesting and breeding habitat
consisting of large blocks of unfragmented or closed-canopy,
mature hardwood forest." Id. at 12. The ALRMP prohibits
the harvesting of timber in the FIMUs during the nesting
season, but not outside the FIMUs. See id. at 34. The court
stated, "There is no attempt [by the Forest Service] to re-
spond to the plaintiffs logical assumption that forest interior
birds will be killed if they are nesting outside the FIMUs and
there are no seasonal restrictions . . .placed on logging in
these non-FIMU areas." Id. at 35. The court directed the
Forest Service to "more fully address this issue on remand."
Id.
In a recent timber harvesting decision, the Forest Service
planned to "clearcut" forty-six acres, "shelterwood" cut four
acres and sell the timber. Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1559. The
plaintiffs argued that the planned harvest by the Forest Ser-
vice would "indirectly 'take' migratory birds by destroying
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their habitat . . . ," and that "logging during nesting season
would directly 'take' migratory birds." Id. at 1573. The court
held that "habitat destruction and logging during nesting
season do not produce 'takings' of migratory birds within the
purview of the MBTA." Id. In reaching its decision, the court
relied on the comparison of the term "take" as outlined in Se-
attle Audubon Society. Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1574 (citing
Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 952 F.2d at 302-03). The court found
that "a 'taking' under the MBTA does not include habitat
modification resulting from Forest Service sales activity." Id.
The plaintiffs asserted that the cases of United States v. FMC
Corp. and United States v. Corbin Farm Services supported
that the timber harvest constituted a "taking." FMC Corp.,
572 F.2d 902; United States v. Corbin Farm Services, 444 F.
Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal. 1978), affd, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.
1978). The Mahler court distinguished their case from the
two cited cases, as they were hazardous substance cases. The
court stated that it would not extend the scope of the MBTA
as it was intended to regulate hunting and trade in bird
parts. Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1574 n.8.
The present case is distinguishable from Mahler. In
Mahler, the court misinterpreted the legislative history of the
MBTA when it concluded that the scope of the MBTA was
intended to regulate hunting and trading in bird parts. See
id. As the legislative history indicates, the MBTA is not an
exclusive hunting and trading regulation. The purpose of the
Act was to protect and preserve migratory birds and their
habitats. Further, the Mahler court erred in not considering
the plaintiffs argument for the court to consider the hazard-
ous substance cases. For example, in Van Fossen, the court
stated, "Neither the common grackle . . .nor the mourning
doves . . . is endangered or even threatened .. . Although
neither species seems to need protection, each is 'migratory'
and the regulations under the MBTA do not allow people to
poison them..." Van Fossen, 899 F.2d at 637. See also FMC
Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (deciding the toxic wastewater leak was
an unintentional act by FMC, but still a violation of the
MBTA). The court in Mahler incorrectly reached the decision
that only direct "takings" violate the MBTA. Hazardous sub-
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stance cases have indicated that the unlawful killing of even
one migratory bird is an offense under the MBTA. Corbin
Farm Servs., 444 F.Supp. at 536. The Corbin court also indi-
cated that the sole purpose for the enactment of the MBTA
was not for just hunting and trading, but for the protection of
migratory birds. See id. at 532.
The following day after Mahler's decision, in a similar
case, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
issued an injunction against timber harvesting. Sierra Club
v. Martin, 933 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ga. 1996). In this case,
the court found that the planned harvesting during nesting
season would result in the deaths of 2,000 to 9,000 juvenile
birds. See id. at 1563. The court found that a taking "does
not occur simply because of habitat destruction or modifica-
tion." Id. at 1564. The court relied on the decision of Sierra
Club v. United States Department of Agriculture and stopped
the harvesting after the court determined that the cutting of
timber during the nesting season would violate the MBTA.
See id. at 1565 (citing Sierra Club, No. 94-CV-4061-JPG at
35. The court reasoned that, "The instant case is even
stronger that Sierra Club v. United States Department of Ag-
riculture, since in this case, plaintiffs have affirmative evi-
dence of the number of deaths that will occur and are not
merely relying upon assumptions." Sierra Club, 933 F. Supp.
at 1565-73 (discussing Sierra Club, No. 94-CV-4061-JPG).
The court found that the affirmative evidence of the deaths of
thousands of migratory birds would violate the MBTA. See
id.
After the Martin decision, the plaintiffs petitioned the
District Court in Mahler to reconsider its decision concerning
the MBTA. The motion to reconsider, draws a distinction be-
tween the timber harvesting cases, which finds direct "tak-
ings" a violation of the MBTA, but not indirect "takings."
Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1576. The court found that "planned
salvage logging activity in the Hoosier National Forest" did
not violate the MBTA even during nesting season. Id. at
1576. The court also rejected the Forest Service's argument
that "no one other than the United States government may
invoke the MBTA." Id. at 1578.
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However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the preliminary
injunctions of the District Court in Sierra Club v. Martin. Si-
erra Club, 110 F.3d 1551. In reversing the preliminary in-
junction, the court held that the MBTA is a criminal statute
and does not apply to the federal government. See id. at
1555. In addition, the court held that the Forest Service's ac-
tion did not violate the MBTA and that the Sierra Club was
unable to seek judicial relief under the APA. See id. at 1555-
56. However, the Martin court was incorrect in finding that
the Forest Service did not violate the MBTA, nor was Sierra
Club able to seek judicial relief under the APA. As will be
discussed, the Service, through its planning and actions may
violate the MBTA. The flaws of the Forest Service's planning
and actions are reviewable under the APA.
C. The Forest Service's Plan for the New Union National
Forest Agrees with CSB that Habitat Destruction
Will Occur by Blackacre, because the Current
Violation of the MBTA.
1. The Forest Service's Plan is not in Compliance
With 16 U.S.C. § 1600 et. seq.
The Forest Service has employed some form of planning
for a number of years. After the passage of the Multiple-Use,
Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA), the Forest Service developed
formal district and regional Multiple-Use Planning Guides.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994). The National Forest Man-
agement Act's (NFMA's) main focus and the implementing
regulations is on "where" timber may be harvested (based on
the physical and economic suitability of the land); "how
much" timber may be cut (analyzing the concepts of sustained
yield, non-declining even-flow, rotation age, culmination of
mean annual increment of growth, and earned harvest ef-
fect); and "how" by using even-aged management techniques,
along with whether restrictions should be placed on clearcut-
ting. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994). Three sections of the
Act are pertinent to timber harvesting cases.
First, section 1604 states that the Forest Service is pre-
cluded from harvesting "'marginal' lands (where resource pro-
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tection or reforestation cannot be insure[d]" and lands on
which logging would destroy the "diversity of plant and
animal communities." Second, the Forest Service is required
to insure that clearcutting is the "optimum method. . . to
meet the objectives and requirements of the relevant land
management plan." 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (g)(3)(F)(i) (1994).
Third, the statute also requires an adequate assurance that
the land, which is to be harvested for timber, can be restocked
within five years. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (g)(3)(E)(ii) (1994).
In Sierra Club v. Cargill, the district court enjoined tim-
ber harvesting in the Bighorn National Forest. The Forest
Service plan contained a seven-year regeneration plan in vio-
lation of 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (g)(3)(E)(ii). Sierra Club, 732 F.
Supp 1095. The court remanded the case so that the Forest
Service could revise its plan to meet the five-year regenera-
tion period. On remand, the Forest Service only changed the
seven-year period to five-years with no considerable changes.
The court rejected the modification and upheld the injunc-
tion. The Tenth Circuit incorrectly viewed the case as if it
were on appeal from the original decision of the District
Court. The court held that the Forest Service's expertise and
discretion of the plan was adequate. The Tenth Circuit re-
manded the case to the District Court for dissolution of the
injunction. Sierra Club v. Cargill, 11 F.3d 1545 (10th Cir.
1993) reh'g denied (1994).
2. The Forest Service Did Not Adequately Consider
the Alternatives, Nor Adhere to the
Requirements of NEPA.
The Forest Service utilizes computer-based models in
their planning. George C. Coggins, The Developing Law of
Land Use Planning on the Federal Lands, 61 U. CoLo. L.
REV. 301, 342 (1989). The regulations require that the Forest
Service generate and consider a minimum of four alterna-
tives: (1) the most cost-efficient means of meeting the Forest
and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (RPA)
(codified under the NFMA), targets assigned to the forest in
the regional guide; (2) a "no action" alternative that continues
current forest management practices; (3) an alternative that
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maximizes marketable resources; and (4) an alternative that
maximizes nonmarket resources. 36 C.F.R. § 219.12(f)
(1994). The District Court in Colorado reviewed the types of
alternatives the Forest Service needs to generate, and looked
at the consideration the Forest Service must give to each al-
ternative. This case concerned the creation of an LRMP for
the Rio Grande Forest. The court found that the Forest Ser-
vice had not given an adequate explanation of the LRMP.
Further, the court required the Forest Service to generate a
wide range of alternative plans and not those that only sup-
port the Forest Service's goals. The court also instructed the
Forest Service to take a harder look at differing alternatives
that do not meet the desired result of the Forest Service. Cit-
izens for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970,
979-80 (D. Colo. 1989). As with most computer-generated
models, the only way to achieve the best-utilized model is by
inputting the accurate information. The Forest Service rec-
ognizes that the planning documents are legal documents
and that courts will review these plans substantively and
procedurally. Coggins, supra, at 345.
Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
federal agencies must include a detailed statement on the en-
vironmental impact of the proposed action in every recom-
mendation of legislation or federal action that significantly
affects the quality of the human environment. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370 (1994). In order to satisfy the NEPA require-
ments, an agency generally performs an environmental as-
sessment (EA) before performing an environmental impact
statement (EIS) to determine if the EIS is necessary. See 40
C.F.R. §§ 1501.3, 1508.9 (1997). If there is no finding of a sig-
nificant impact by the agency, an EIS is not necessary. See
40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (a)(1) (1997). The Forest Service does not
need to engage in the NEPA provisions, during its planning
process, until after the Land Resource Management Plans
(LRMPs) have been adopted for specific timber sales. See
generally Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 970.
However, the Forest Service generally does prepare an EIS
within the context of the NFMA planning process. See 36
C.F.R. § 219.10(a), (b) (1997).
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Recent Congressional legislation has provided for the
Forest Service to develop a notice and comment procedure for
actions taken under LRMP's. See Department of the Interior
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No.
102-381, § 322, 106 Stat. 1374, 1419 (1992). The Forest Ser-
vice pronounced regulations for appeals of project-level deci-
sions. See 36 C.F.R. § 215 (1996). Comments are to be
received within 30 days after the publication date for the no-
tice of public comment. See id. After the officer in charge of
making the decision has issued its finding, another forty-five
day period for an appeal of decision is allowed. An appealed
decision is stayed until fifteen days after the date the officer
decides the appeal. See id. The only exclusions of appeals
are actions not subject to NEPA, actions provided for in a
draft EIS covered by other notice and comment procedures,
and insignificant amendments to LRMP's subject to appeal
under 36 C.F.R. § 215.
The Petitioners contend that they did not contemplate
notice to or action by the Forest Service before Blackacre be-
gins to harvest timber. (R. at 3.) As indicated above, Con-
gress enacted a notice and comment period for LRMP's. No
exclusions under 36 C.F.R. § 215 are applicable to the Forest
Service's failure to provide for a notice and comment proce-
dure. On the contrary, timber harvest actions are subject to
notice and comment. See 36 C.F.R. § 215.4(b) (1996). As in-
dicated in the record, CSB has complied with all the neces-
sary appeals before bringing this action to the District Court.
(R. at 2.) Therefore, the Forest Service has failed to comply
with the requirements of providing for a notice and comment
procedure.
In the present case, the CSB contends that the MBTA
does prohibit the killing of migratory birds by clearcutting
forests during bird nesting season. Blackacre disagrees.
However, the United States answers that the MBTA prohib-
its the killing of migratory birds, except when the birds are
killed in accordance with specifically allowed actions in a for-
est management plan or logging sale.
The plain reading of the statute indicates that the killing
of migratory birds is unlawful. The legislative history and the
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conventions affirm that the purpose of the statute was to pro-
tect birds and their habitats. The court in Sierra Club v.
United States Department of Agriculture found that the For-
est Service's review of FIMU's was inadequate as the timber
harvesting of non-FIMU's would be killed, while nesting. The
court also found no seasonal restrictions placed on the log-
ging of these FIMU's. In the present case, "The Plan nor the
timber sale restrict the season of the year in which clearcut-
ting is allowed." (R. at 2.) The Forest Service's own EIS is in
accordance with CSB's contention. The EIS states, " . . . If
cutting occurs during spring or summer months, it will un-
doubtedly result in the loss of nests with their eggs or chicks."
Id. The EIS has clearly established, based on a baseline
study, the various species of birds that would be affected by
this clearcutting and the approximate number of nests and
birds that would also be affected. See id. Further, the EIS
acknowledges that habitat destruction will occur as a result
of the clearcutting. This may contribute to long-term bird
population depletions, however the EIS does not quantify this
impact. See id. The EIS prepared by the Forest Service is in
agreement with CSB's contention that there will be a signifi-
cant impact on the proposed timber sale agreement. In addi-
tion, the Forest Service has failed to provide for a notice and
comment period before proceeding with the harvesting of tim-
ber in Big Tree Tract. This act is in violation of §§ 215.
The District Court correctly assessed the Forest Service
as being highhanded. The United States has argued that it is
above the law when it violates the MBTA. Congress clearly
added for the protection for Department of Interior employees
in specific instances from being in direct violation of the
MBTA. See 50 C.F.R. § 21.12(a) (1996). Had Congress in-
tended to preclude the government, in its entirety, from viola-
tions under the MBTA, it would have expressed its intent in
the statutory language of the Act.
The proposed timber harvest site is an "old growth"
stand within the New Union National Forest, and the United
States District Court for the District of New Union correctly
identified the "old growth" stand in the Big Tree Tract.
"[0] nly recently have scientists studied the ecological value of
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old-growth forest. Now scientists widely recognize old-
growth stands as unique ecosystems noted for the rich soil
they generate ... the still unidentified genetic diversity of
valuable species found in these forests . . . " Alyson C.
Flournoy, Beyond the "Spotted Owl Problem". Learning from
the Old-Growth Controversy, 17 HARv. L. REV. 261, 265
(1993).
As previously discussed, the NFMA states that the For-
est Service is precluded from harvesting on marginal lands,
where reforestation cannot be insured. In addition, the Ser-
vice is precluded from logging on lands, which would destroy
the "diversity of plant and animal communities." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1604 (1997). The statute also requires the Forest Service to
inquire if clearcutting is the "optimum method.., to meet the
objectives and requirements of the relevant land manage-
ment plan." Id.
The Forest Service has agreed that the EIS will result in
habitat destruction in the old-growth area of the Big Tree
Tract. (R. at 2.) However, the Forest Service has failed to
prove that the clearcutting in the Big Tree Tract is the "opti-
mum method" to meet the objects and requirements of its
land management plan. Further, the Forest Service's Plan
does not adequately insure the Big Tree Tract will be
regenerated within a five-year period. The United States has
asserted, there are exceptions to the MBTA. As provided in
§ 1604, the Secretary of the Interior may allow some taking of
migratory birds from time to time, "having due regard to the
zones of temperature and to the distribution, abundance, eco-
nomic value, breeding habits, and times and lines of migra-
tory flight of such birds," in order to determine the extent and
when, if allowed at all, and by what means, being compatible
with the conventions "to allow hunting, taking, capture, kill-
ing ... of any such bird, or any part, nest, or egg thereof... "
§ 1604. In the present case, due regard should be given to the
zones of breeding habits, and times and lines of flight of mi-
gratory birds. To allow the taking and death of the migratory
birds in Big Tree Tract would be a violation of the conven-
tions, which established the structure of the MBTA.
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IV. THE MBTA AND THE NFMA ARE IN ACCORD
FOR PURPOSES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
UNDER THE APA
A. The Language of the APA Applies to Agency Action
Including NFMA's Violation of the MBTA.
The Administrative Procedure Act states that, "To the
extent necessary to decision and when presented, the review-
ing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional provisions, and determine the meaning or ap-
plicability of the terms of an agency action." § 706. The APA
provides for jurisdiction over an agency action alleged to be in
violation of the MBTA. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 914 F.2d
131, 503 U.S. 429. In Mahler, the court conducted an exten-
sive search and concluded that the APA "may be used by a
party with standing to challenge government action that
would violate the MBTA." Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1579.
B. The NFMA is Subject to Review Under the APA if its
Decisions are Inadequately Determined.
Challenges to timber harvesting sales generally consist
of allegations that the Forest Service violated one or more
statutes. Courts will determine if the Forest Service reached
a decision which was "arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or not in accordance with the law." § 706. Under
NEPA, the Forest Service must include detailed statements
concerning the environmental impacts of the proposed action.
See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1994). The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that the primary function of an EIS under NEPA is
to insure a fully informed and well-considered decision. See
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
The Petitioner's argue that the MBTA is not law that
governs timber sales. The court in Mahler states that the
MBTA does apply to all actions that directly kills migratory
birds. See Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1576. Blackacre has
stated that it intends to kill migratory birds during their
nesting season. (R. at 2.) The Forest Service's EIS shows that
various migratory birds will be killed as a direct result of the
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clearcutting on Big Tree Tract. (R. at 2.) Under NEPA, an
EIS is required in every recommendation of legislation or fed-
eral action that significantly affects the quality of human en-
vironment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994). The EIS
performed by the Forest Service is in direct violation of
NFMA. The Forest Service's EIS does not adequately assure
the resource protection or reforestation in the old growth
tracts, where the logging is to occur. Further, the Forest Ser-
vice does recognize that the logging will destroy a diversity of
plant and animal communities. See § 1604: See also Sierra
Club, 732 F. Supp 1095.
The Forest Service is to review and consider all types of
alternatives. See Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at
979-80. All of the aforementioned acts preclude the Forest
Service from timber harvesting on the Big Tree Tract under
the NFMA. The Petitioner's argue that if Blackacre were not
to clearcut during the nesting season, then the MBTA would
not apply. This argument is incorrect, as Blackacre has
stated that it intends to clearcut during the spring and sum-
mer nesting seasons. (R. at 2.)
The NFMA may not in any way violate the MBTA with-
out incurring criminal or civil liability from the violation. See
Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1576. The MBTA is no different from
any criminal statute insofar as the enactment of the NFMA
or any other law cannot obviate the effectiveness of the stat-
ute. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994). The NFMA cannot legally vio-
late any criminal statute, just as the government's right to
build power plants to generate necessary power is superseded
by laws created to preserve clean water conditions in lakes,
so is the NFMA's power qualified by the MBTA. Duke Power
Co., 438 U.S. 59; Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305
(1982).
The Ninth Circuit in Evans, rejected plaintiffs claims
under the MBTA. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 952 F.2d 297.
The court distinguished between the terms "take" in the
MBTA and in the Endangered Species Act (ESA). See Endan-
gered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1997). The court noted
that only the ESA explicitly prohibits the indirect killing
through habitat modification. The court held that "the differ-
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ences in the proscribed conduct under the ESA and the
MBTA are 'distinct and purposeful."' Seattle Audubon Soc'y,
952 F.2d at 303. Accordingly, the court concluded that
habitat destruction, which causes incidental "harm" to owls
under the ESA, does not necessarily "take" them within the
meaning of the MBTA. See id. However, the court said that
actions leading to the direct death of birds, such as clearcut-
ting during nesting season would fall within the purview of
the MBTA. See id.
The MBTA's prohibition against the "taking" of owls "at
any time, by any means or in any manner," in the absence of
appropriate regulations, did not apply to harm caused indi-
rectly by habitat degradation. Id. The MBTA separates the
proscription against "killing" listed species and the record es-
tablishing that logging killed spotted owls. This means that
the MBTA is law insofar as it makes it a crime to directly kill
migratory birds by destroying trees bearing their nests. See
id. However, the general destruction of trees that contain mi-
gratory bird nests, is a direct killing of these birds. Blackacre
has stated it plans to clearcut during nesting season, there-
fore, the MBTA provides CSB with injunctive relief to pre-
vent such cutting. (R. at 2.)
Furthermore, while courts have not yet expanded the
MBTA to include just any cutting of trees that might later
harm migratory birds, the NEPA has stated requirements for
the NFMA to follow to protect the bird's habitat. In the pres-
ent case, 500 acres of the Big Tree Tract of the New Union
National Forest has been set aside for clearcutting. As the
lower court notes, whether this is done during or before nest-
ing season, the migratory birds will suffer an appreciable loss
of their habitat. (R. at 2.) The lower court chose not to par-
ticipate in a form of judicial activism, as have other courts.
See Sierra Club, 110 F.3d 1551; Newton County Wildlife
Assn. v. United States Forest Service, 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir.
1997); Mahler, 927 F. Supp. 1554. The plain language of the
APA statute indicates that the MBTA is an agency under its
review, as is the NFMA. The Forest Service is in violation of
the NFMA as stated above. The NFMA is in accordance with
the violation of the MBTA by directly "taking" or "killing" any
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migratory birds. Therefore, the MBTA is "law" with which
agency actions under the NFMA must be in accordd for judi-
cial review under the APA.
Conclusion
The District Court for the District of New Union correctly
denied Petitioners' motion to dismiss the action brought by
Citizens to Save the Birds. CSB's claim is ripe for review as
the MBTA affords cause of action created by the clearcutting
authorization. Because this authorization is final, primarily
legal issues are raised and the possibility that birds will be
killed is created. Standing is proper. In addition, Respon-
dents would incur undue hardship if this court denied them
standing.
Under the MBTA, the Forest Service and Blackacre are
strictly liable for taking and/or killing migratory birds by
clearcutting the Big Tree Tract. The legislative history evi-
dences Congress's intent to create a strict liability, misde-
meanor offense under the MBTA. The MBTA prohibits the
killing of migratory birds during bird nesting season without
providing an exception for a forest managing plan or logging
sale. The legislative history shows that the purpose of the
statute is to protect migratory birds and their habitat, and it
is unlawful to kill any migratory bird by any means.
The MBTA is law with which agency actions under the
National Forest Management Act must be in accord for pur-
poses of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure
Act. The Forest Service must follow the MBTA in formulat-
ing management plans under the NFMA and any actions by
the agency fall within the jurisdiction of the APA.
For the reasons stated in this brief, the Respondents re-
spectfully request this Court to uphold the decision of the
United States District Court for the District of New Union
and render judgement for Citizens to Save the Birds.
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